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WATER AS A PUBLIC COMMODITY 
BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Three themes have dominated the principal debates over water law 
and policy during the last quarter century.  The first theme is water as a 
public trust, with title to water resources held by the state as custodian 
for the public as a whole and with an obligation to manage water on a 
holistic basis to maximize overall societal benefit.1  While the public 
trust doctrine historically emphasized the importance of waterways for 
navigation and commerce, it recently has focused on the need for 
sustainable environmental protection for current and future 
generations.2  The second theme is water as an economic commodity, to 
be priced, traded, and managed by the private sector.3  The final vision is 
water as a global human right, under which all people have access to 
 
* Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law, Stanford Law School; Perry 
L. McCarty Director, Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University; Senior 
Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies, Stanford University.  Particular 
thanks are due to Professor Richard Howitt of the University of California at Davis for first 
suggesting the term “public commodity” to describe the emerging vision for water 
management.  Our book on California water policy incorporates the term.  ELLEN HANAK, 
JAY LUND, ARIEL DINAR, BRIAN GRAY, RICHARD HOWITT, JEFFREY MOUNT, PETER 
MOYLE & BARTON “BUZZ” THOMPSON, MANAGING CALIFORNIA’S WATER: FROM 
CONFLICT TO RECONCILIATION 315–48 (2011).  I am also grateful for comments and 
suggestions received at the symposium on “Changing Conceptions of Water in the Law” at 
the annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools in January 2011 and from 
members of the Workshop on Development and the Environment at the University of 
California at Berkeley School of Law.  Finally, I am indebted to Josh Patashnik (Stanford 
Law School ’11) for invaluable research assistance. 
1. For the classic article on the public trust doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 
(1970). 
2. Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging 
Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 393–96, 402–09 (1991); see also 
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (concluding that the “public uses” which the 
trust protects “are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs,” including 
ecological preservation). 
3. See, e.g., Jennifer Davis, Private-Sector Participation in the Water and Sanitation 
Sector, 30 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 145, 153–56 (2005) (detailing the privatization of 
water supply and sanitation services in both developing and industrial nations). 
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clean and adequate water resources for basic personal and domestic 
needs.4 
All three themes have gained ascendancy in recent years, despite 
claimed and perceived inconsistencies.  According to many 
commentators, treating water as a commodity is incompatible with 
managing water as either a public trust or a human right.5  Full-cost 
pricing of water, allocation of water to the highest bidder, and private-
sector involvement in water management are all, from the perspective of 
these commentators, inconsistent with the view that water is a unique 
public resource that should be managed to promote the broad public 
interest (particularly with regards to the environment and the rights of 
the poorest members of society).6  Given this claimed inconsistency, the 
simultaneous rise of all three themes would seem incoherent and 
surprising. 
In fact, all three themes are potentially harmonious, although there 
inherently will be tensions.  Indeed, any one theme by itself will result in 
either an impoverished or ineffective water vision.  Water policies that 
fail to protect the environment are unlikely, certainly in the long run 
and potentially even in the short run, to fulfill human needs not only for 
basic domestic needs, but also for food security and economic 
development.  And economic tools such as pricing, markets, and 
privatization can be important and even essential means of meeting both 
human and environmental needs, as well as maximizing the economic 
benefits to be derived from water resources.  Only a combination of the 
three ascendant themes can provide a holistic and workable vision for 
water management. 
When combined, the three themes suggest an alternative vision of 
water as a public commodity.  This vision recognizes that the public has 
a critical interest in water.  Water is unique among all resources.  Water 
 
4. For general analyses of water as a human right, see Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications 
of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 967–77 (2004); Peter H. 
Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487 (1999). 
5. For criticisms of the view that water should be treated as a commodity, see MAUDE 
BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE COMING BATTLE FOR 
THE RIGHT TO WATER 58–62, 91–101 (2007); VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS: 
PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND PROFIT 15, 27–28, 34–36 (2002); Williamson B.C. Chang, 
Water: Consumer Commodity or Government Subsidy?, in WATER VALUES AND MARKETS: 
EMERGING MANAGEMENT TOOLS 18, 18–20 (Linda Schroeder ed., 1986); Eric T. Freyfogle, 
Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 35–37 (1996). 
6. See BARLOW, supra note 5, at 58–62, 91–97; SHIVA, supra note 5, at 27, 34–36; Chang, 
supra note 5, at 18–20; Freyfogle, supra note 5, at 35. 
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is essential not only to life, but to virtually any human endeavor and 
thus the betterment of society.  Water is an irreplaceable element of 
most healthy, functioning ecosystems—and thus the production of 
ecosystem services is of importance to people.  Water also is intrinsic to 
most religions and cultural systems.  For all these reasons, water is 
inherently public, and governments have a continuing obligation to 
ensure its effective management for overall societal well-being, 
including both environmental protection and essential human 
consumptive needs.  However, commodifying water can actually help 
promote these goals.  Pricing, markets, and even the participation of 
private entities have helped ensure that water is not wasted and, when 
properly directed and regulated, can help promote the environment and 
increase drinking-water access.  Treating water as public but not as a 
commodity will fail to maximize societal benefits, while treating water as 
a commodity but not as public will fail to ensure that water meets all 
public needs. 
Part II of this Article sets out the three basic themes, their 
importance to water policy, and their simultaneous rise over the last 
several decades.  Part III then considers potential inconsistencies 
between the themes and examines, in particular, how the 
commoditization of water has helped increase societal benefits from 
scarce water resources and how it can help further maximize those 
benefits in the future.  Part IV briefly concludes by setting out a vision 
of water as a public commodity. 
II.  THREE THEMES 
An examination of international documents, statutes, and judicial 
opinions displays a wide variety of themes that pervade the thinking and 
analyses of policy makers and jurists.  However, three themes in 
particular have grown increasingly common in recent decades: the 
public trust doctrine, water as a human right, and the roles of markets 
and the private sector in managing water resources. 
A.  Water as a Public Trust 
The oldest and most established theme is water as a public trust.7  As 
 
7. See generally Sax, supra note 1.  For articles examining the applicability of the public 
trust doctrine to water resources, see Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and 
the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701 (1995); Cynthia L. Koehler, 
Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 
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elaborated in the cases and laws cited and discussed below, the public 
trust doctrine incorporates at least three important principles.  First, the 
government holds ultimate title to water on behalf of the public as a 
whole.  Although the government can grant individuals and private 
entities limited rights to use water (as it does, for example, under both 
the riparian and prior-appropriation systems), the government should 
and does retain ultimate title and control over the water.  Second, the 
government holds title to water as a trustee for the public as a whole.  
Water is not like other governmental property—such as post offices, city 
halls, military bases, or even parks—over which the government holds 
broad ownership rights and discretion.  Instead, the government has a 
responsibility to manage water for the interests of the public and, as a 
result, holds more restricted ownership rights.  Finally, irrespective of 
what private rights the government has awarded in the past or what 
actions individuals and private entities have taken in reliance on prior 
policies, the government has both the authority and the obligation to 
reallocate water and change management rules at any point in time in 
response to changing conditions, information, or public norms because it 
has a continuing obligation to manage water for public trust purposes. 
During the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, the 
public trust doctrine found voice primarily in decisions of U.S. courts 
dealing with navigation rights and other non-consumptive uses of 
navigable waterways.8  Recent decades, however, have seen an 
expansion of the public trust doctrine both substantively to 
environmental and cultural interests in water and geographically to a 
broader set of common law jurisdictions.  In the United States, courts of 
a number of states have explicitly held that the public trust doctrine 
applies not only to waterways, but also to the waters of those 
waterways.9  Furthermore, driven by evidence that extensive diversions 
 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 541 (1995); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of 
Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257 (1990); and The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resources Law and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181 (1980). 
8. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–64 (1892); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 
N.J.L. 1, 41 (1821). 
9. The key precedent here is the California Supreme Court’s decision in National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 728–32 
(Cal. 1983).  At least five other states have also held that the public trust doctrine applies to 
water resources.  See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 
445, 453 (Haw. 2000); Idaho Conservation League v. State, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995); 
Selkirk–Priest Basin Ass’n v. State, 899 P.2d 949, 953, 956 (Idaho 1995); Dep’t of State Lands 
v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 957 (Mont. 1985); Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 608, 612–
14, 617 (Nev. 2011); United Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 
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of water from rivers and lakes are harming fish and threatening overall 
aquatic ecosystems, several of these courts have used the public trust 
doctrine to limit such diversions and increase environmental flows.10  For 
example, in its 1984 Mono Lake decision, the California Supreme Court 
concluded that the public trust doctrine requires the government to 
manage water use where possible to protect the environment.11  And in a 
subsequent decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the public 
trust doctrine, as incorporated in Hawaii’s constitution, requires the 
state not only to protect the environment, but also to manage surface 
and groundwater on a sustainable basis for the benefit of both native 
communities and future generations.12 
At the same time, a growing set of common law nations have 
explicitly recognized the relevance and importance of the public trust 
doctrine in water management.13  For example, in a 1997 case involving 
the realignment of a river by a corporate interest, the Supreme Court of 
India explicitly held that, as a vestige of its common law background, the 
public trust doctrine applies to running waters and legally obligates the 
government to protect aquatic environments.14  Subsequent decisions by 
courts of both Sri Lanka and Kenya have followed suit in recognizing 
that the government holds all the waters of the nation, as well as other 
publicly important property, in trust for the public.15  South Africa has 
 
N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976). 
10. See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728–29, 732; Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 461. 
11. 658 P.2d at 728. 
12. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 451, 453 & n.41 (citing HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 3). 
13. For discussions of the public trust doctrine outside the United States, see Lucas 
Bento, Searching for Intergenerational Green Solutions: The Relevance of the Public Trust 
Doctrine to Environmental Preservation, 11 COMMON L. REV. 7, 12 (2009); Philippe Cullet, 
Water Law in a Globalised World: The Need for a New Conceptual Framework, 23 J. ENVTL. 
L. 233, 234–36, 242–43 (2011); Patricia Kameri-Mbote, The Use of the Public Trust Doctrine in 
Environmental Law, 3/2 L. ENV’T & DEV. J. 195 (2007), available at http://www.lead-
journal.org/content/07195.pdf; and David Takacs, Student Essay, The Public Trust Doctrine, 
Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 
712, 735–47 (2008). 
14. M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996) Supp. 10 S.C.R. 12, 45 (India) (“The State is the 
trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment.”).  
According to the India Supreme Court, running waters are natural resources to which the 
public is a beneficiary.  Id. 
15. See Waweru v. The Republic, (2006) 1 K.L.R. 677, 692 (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (holding 
that the government holds waterways “under a public trust to manage them in a way that 
maintains a proper balance between the economic benefits of development with the needs of 
a clean environment”); Bulankulama v. Sec’y, Ministry of Indus. Dev., 3 SRI L.R. 243, 253–54 
(Sup. Ct. 2000) (Sri Lanka) (adopting concept of public guardianship). 
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recognized the public trust doctrine by statute.  Under South Africa’s 
1998 National Water Act, the national government is the “public trustee 
of the nation’s water resources” and must “ensure that water is 
protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a 
sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons and in 
accordance with its constitutional mandate.”16 
Although the most explicit statement of the public trust doctrine is 
found in cases of common law nations, the doctrine’s pedigree is not 
purely common law.  Most experts trace the doctrine’s lineage to the 
Corpus Juris Civilis, commissioned by the Roman Emperor Justinian, 
which stated that “running water,” along with such resources as air and 
the sea, are “common to all” by the nature of the resources themselves.17  
Not surprisingly, the laws of a wide variety of jurisdictions, both civil 
and common law, incorporate and reflect key elements of the public 
trust doctrine.  Governments almost universally hold title to their 
nation’s water resources, and private rights in the water—where 
recognized at all—are at the discretion of the government.18  Moreover, 
most nations emphasize that the government holds the water as a 
guardian for the people as a whole.  For example, China’s constitution 
provides that the state owns water, as well as a number of other natural 
resources, on behalf of the “whole people,”19 and the French Water Act 
of 1992 states that the use of water belongs to everyone.20  Increasingly, 
national constitutions and laws emphasize the importance of managing 
water for environmental sustainability, although such provisions are less 
 
16. National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 3(1) (S. Afr.). 
17. J. INST. 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle trans., 1913).  For discussions of the public trust doctrine’s 
presumed Roman roots, see Bento, supra note 13, at 7; William Drayton, Jr., Note, The 
Public Trust Doctrine in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE 
L.J. 762, 763–64 (1970); Kameri-Mbote, supra note 13, at 197–98; Takacs, supra note 13, at 
711, 713. 
18. There are exceptions, however.  For example, the Chilean Constitution of 1980 
provides that “[t]he rights of private citizens over waters, recognized or constituted in 
conformity with the law, shall grant proprietorship to the owners thereof.”  CONSTITUCIÓN 
POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, § 24; see also Constitución Política de 
los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P], as amended, art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) (establishing the power in the government to transmit title 
to water to private persons in the form of private property). 
19. XIANFA. art. 9 (1982) (China). 
20. Loi 92-3 du 3 janvier 1992 sur l’eau [Law 92-3 of January 3, 1992, On Water], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Jan. 4, 1992, p. 187. 
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common and more hortatory than mandatory.21 
B.  Water as a Commodity 
Neoliberal ascendancy in law and policy during the second half of 
the twentieth century also saw increased emphasis on the importance of 
treating water as a commodity.  Several factors beyond ideology, 
however, have helped drive the commoditization of water.  First, 
growing water scarcity generated demands for greater water-use 
efficiency through full-cost pricing and more rigorous management of 
water systems.22  Second, continued urbanization increased interest in 
reallocating water from agriculture to growing cities, for which markets 
seemed the most politically palatable mechanism.23  Finally, the inability 
of public water suppliers to provide access to ever increasing urban 
populations in developing nations, and a need for greater levels of 
investment in infrastructure throughout most of the world, created a 
potential market for private water suppliers.24 
A variety of legal and policy documents over the last quarter century 
have incorporated or reflected the vision of water as a commodity.  
Most prominently, the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable 
Development, which arose out of the International Conference on 
Water and the Environment in Dublin, Ireland, in 1992, established as 
one of its guiding principles that “[w]ater has an economic value in all its 
competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.”25  
According to the Dublin Statement, “Past failure to recognize the 
economic value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally 
damaging uses of the resource [and m]anaging water as an economic 
good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of 
 
21. At the most general level, almost 120 nations currently provide for environmental 
protection in their constitutions.  Takacs, supra note 13, at 726. 
22. See, e.g., Peter Rogers et al., Water Is an Economic Good: How to Use Prices to 
Promote Equity, Efficiency, and Sustainability, 4 WATER POL’Y 1, 1–4, 7–9 (2002). 
23. See, e.g., ROBERT STAVINS, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER 
37–38 (1983) (arguing for the use of water markets to meet the growing demands of Southern 
California urban areas). 
24. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 154–56 (noting that capital investment and the need 
for more efficient service delivery has driven the interest in private firms). 
25. Int’l Conference on Water and the Env’t, Dublin, Ir., Jan. 26–31, 1992, The Dublin 
Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, princ. 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/COMF.151/PC112 [hereinafter Dublin Statement], available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/pr
og/hwrp/documents/english/icwedece.html. 
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encouraging conservation and protection of water resources.”26  Outside 
the Dublin Statement, the vision of water as a commodity is found most 
frequently in laws enabling or dictating particular market policies, such 
as full-cost pricing or water markets,27 and in the guidance documents, 
strategic plans, and loan conditions of international economic 
organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund.28 
1.   Full-Cost Pricing of Water 
The vision of water as a commodity incorporates at least three 
separate but overlapping concepts.  The first is water as a fully priced 
resource.  Most nations historically not only charged nothing for the 
extraction of water from the environment, but also subsidized the 
transportation, purification, and delivery of water, reflecting both a 
desire to promote economic development for which water is an essential 
input and to recognize water’s fundamental importance to all citizens.29  
Some water managers even denied that the normal rules of economics 
applied to water: water demand, it was claimed, was highly elastic and 
 
26. Id. 
27. For discussions of the rise of water markets and supporting legal structures in the 
western United States and elsewhere, see OLIVER M. BRANDES ET AL., CONFERENCE BD. 
OF CAN., GOING WITH THE FLOW? EVOLVING WATER ALLOCATIONS AND THE POTENTIAL 
AND LIMITS OF WATER MARKETS IN CANADA app. B, at 33–38 (2008); Jedidiah Brewer et 
al., Law and the New Institutional Economics: Water Markets and Legal Change in California, 
1987–2005, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 183, 186–95 (2008); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., 
Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 676, 701–03 
(1993); R. Quentin Grafton et al., An Integrated Assessment of Water Markets: Australia, 
Chile, China, South Africa and the USA 2–3, 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper 
No. 16203, 2010). 
28. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., WATER 
RESOURCES SECTOR STRATEGY: STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR WORLD BANK 
ENGAGEMENT 22–25 (2004) (describing a “principled pragmatism” approach toward water 
pricing and water rights); KAREN BAKKER, PRIVATIZING WATER: GOVERNANCE FAILURE 
AND THE WORLD’S URBAN WATER CRISIS 166–67 (2010) (discussing how the IMF in 1988 
conditioned a loan to Bolivia on the privatization of water supply systems and other state-
owned enterprises). 
29. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX, ROBERT H. ABRAMS & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., 
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 689–90 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter LEGAL 
CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES I]; Davis, supra note 3, at 165 (noting that for “largely 
political reasons” publicly provided water has often been priced below cost); Duane Mecham 
& Benjamin M. Simon, Forging a New Federal Reclamation Water Pricing Policy: Legal and 
Policy Considerations, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 507, 509–10 (1995) (discussing pricing policies and 
subsidies under the federal reclamation program); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Allocation 
and Protection: A United States Case Study, in EARTH SYSTEMS: PROCESSES AND ISSUES 476, 
482 (W.G. Ernst ed., 2000) [hereinafter Water Allocation]. 
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thus not influenced by price.30 
Increasing water scarcity, however, upended that view and replaced 
it with the principle that water should be priced at or near its full cost in 
order to avoid waste and, instead, encourage conservation—in short, 
that water should be treated as an economic commodity.31  In the late 
twentieth century, for example, Congress passed several laws in the 
United States to reduce or eliminate the historical subsidization of 
federal reclamation water for farmers in the West.32  In addition, an 
increasing number of cities and nations have chosen to charge urban 
residents the full cost of delivered water, although allocations of that 
cost across classes of customers differ significantly among jurisdictions.33  
Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund similarly 
have called for full-cost pricing.34 
2.   Water Markets 
The vision of water as a commodity also incorporates water 
marketing.  Many jurisdictions, including in the western United States, 
historically proscribed water marketing.35  Because water was a common 
good rather than a commodity, profiting from the sale of water seemed 
inequitable.  If a water user no longer needed the water he or she was 
using, others should have the right to use the water without having to 
pay the original user.  Water belonged to the public as a whole, not the 
historical user.36 
Again, in response to water scarcity, a growing number of countries 
and sub-national jurisdictions have begun not only to authorize water 
 
30. LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES I, supra note 29, at 689. 
31. See, e.g., Rogers et al., supra note 22, at 2 (noting that water usage is most valuable 
when the price of water reflects its true cost); Water Allocation, supra note 29, at 482–83. 
32. See, e.g., Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 3402, 
3405, 106 Stat. 4600, 4706 (1992); Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 
§§ 202, 205, 96 Stat. 1261, 1263–64, 1265–66 (1982).  For a general overview of federal 
reclamation pricing reforms, see JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. 
LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 771–96 (4th ed. 
2006) [hereinafter LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II]. 
33. See, e.g., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES I, supra note 29, at 690 
(discussing water pricing reform in cities of the western United States). 
34. See generally K. William Easter & Yang Liu, Cost Recovery and Water Pricing for 
Irrigation and Drainage Projects (The World Bank, Agric. and Rural Dev. Discussion Paper 
No. 26, 2005). 
35. LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, at 266–67. 
36. Id. at 266–67 (citing and quoting ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 264, 
365–67 (1903)). 
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marketing and remove legal obstacles, but also to affirmatively promote 
market transfers—adopting here too a vision of water as a commodity.37  
For example, in the United States, both the federal government and 
western states have adopted procedures for reviewing and approving 
water transfers, established water banks through which water can be 
purchased and sold, authorized members of water districts to sell water 
even over the opposition of the districts themselves, opened up 
conveyance facilities for use by market participants, and enacted other 
provisions designed to increase the number and size of transactions.38  
The western United States, moreover, has not been alone in promoting 
water markets.  Nations as diverse as Australia, Canada, Chile, China, 
Mexico, and South Africa have authorized commercial water transfers 
in at least some of their regions.39 
These legal changes have resulted in often robust water markets.  
For example, in both Chile’s Limarí Valley and Australia’s Murray-
Darling Basin, approximately one-third of all water entitlements change 
hands each year.40  According to economic estimates, such markets also 
involve sizable amounts of money and contribute significantly to the 
local economy.  Economists, for example, estimate that water markets in 
the Limarí Valley contribute $22 million annually to the local economy 
(ranging in any given year from 8% to 32% of the agricultural 
contribution to local GDP) and that markets in the Murray-Darling 
Basin contribute almost half a billion dollars in dry years.41  Water 
markets in the western United States have contributed anywhere from 
approximately $1 million in Montana and Wyoming to as high as $223 
million in California.42 
The movement toward water marketing is neither universal nor 
 
37. See, e.g., Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 14–21 (noting the economic efficiency of 
water markets). 
38. For a general overview of these institutions and the law of water markets, see 
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, at 264–98, 731–46, 778–79. 
39. See, e.g., National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 6(1)(g) (S. Afr.); Water Act, R.S.A. 2000, 
c. W-3, s. 5, 11 (Can. Alta.); Law No. 382 art. 7, Diciembre 30, 1988, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 
(Chile); Law No. 1122, Agosto 13, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).  See generally 
Grafton et al., supra note 27 (discussing water markets in Australia, Chile, China, and South 
Africa); Theodore M. Horbulyk & Lynda J. Lo, Welfare Gains from Potential Water Markets 
in Alberta, Canada, in MARKETS FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND PERFORMANCE 241 (K. 
William Easter et al. eds., 1998); Wim H. Kloezen, Water Markets Between Mexican Water 
User Associations, 1 WATER POL’Y 437 (1998). 
40. Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 17. 
41. Id. at 18. 
42. Id. 
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complete.  Water marketing remains controversial.43  Only a small 
minority of nations have laws that encourage water transactions.44  
Moreover, even where the law permits water transfers, both institutional 
impediments—e.g., lengthy and costly administrative review 
procedures—and community opposition to trades have limited the 
number and type of transactions.45  Most water trades are from farmer to 
farmer within the same watershed; few agriculture-to-urban water 
transfers, or inter-basin transfers, have occurred to date in most 
jurisdictions.46  And many water markets see only a handful of 
transactions in any given year.  For example, in the ten years that 
Alberta, Canada, has authorized water transfers, only twenty-eight 
transfers have occurred; only six transfers, representing just 0.05% of 
the total water supply in the relevant basin, were permanent.47 
3.   Private participation in water provision 
A final component of the vision of water as a commodity is the role 
of private companies in the supply of water to urban users.  Private 
companies have always played a role in water provision.  In the United 
States, private companies were early water suppliers to many major 
cities, such as New York and San Francisco.48  In the late nineteenth and 
 
43. For current critiques of water markets, see Chang, supra note 5, at 18–20; Freyfogle, 
supra note 5, at 30–34; see also LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, 
at 298–300 (identifying concerns of some legal scholars). 
44. See Henning Bjornlund & Jennifer McKay, Aspects of Water Markets for Developing 
Countries: Experiences for Australia, Chile, and the US, 7 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 769, 769–70 
(2002) (noting that “[a]ctual experiences within water markets are still sparse,” and 
identifying a few countries that maintain water markets). 
45. For a general discussion of a number of the current obstacles to effective water 
markets in the western United States, see LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra 
note 32, at 264–98. 
46. See, e.g., Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 21–22 (discussing the limited nature of 
water transfers in Chile, the western United States, and South Africa). 
47. BRANDES ET AL., supra note 27, app. B, at 32. 
48. See, e.g., NELSON MANDFRED BLAKE, WATER FOR THE CITIES: A HISTORY OF THE 
URBAN WATER SUPPLY PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 63–78 (1956); LEGAL CONTROL 
OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, at 682 & n.2; ERWIN COOPER, AQUEDUCT 
EMPIRE: A GUIDE TO WATER IN CALIFORNIA, ITS TURBULENT HISTORY AND ITS 
MANAGEMENT TODAY 54 (1968) (noting how San Francisco turned to a private firm to 
provide it with water); Jessica Budds & Gordon McGranahan, Are the Debates on Water 
Privatization Missing the Point?  Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America, 15 ENV’T 
& URBANIZATION 87, 90 (2003); Davis, supra note 3, at 147 (noting that private firms, “often 
with encouragement from local government, undertook a large share of the investment 
required to construct the first water and sewer networks of major cities in the United States 
and England”). 
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early twentieth centuries, however, many cities replaced private supply 
companies with municipal water agencies (although private companies 
continue to supply approximately 15% of all domestic water in the 
United States today).49  This evolution stemmed in large part from a 
concern that water was too important to leave to private economic 
actors; it was feared that private companies would not adequately 
protect water quality or invest sufficiently in the extension and 
maintenance of water systems.50  Many other nations never had 
significant private involvement in the water sector. 
Disillusionment with varied public suppliers, however, has driven a 
reevaluation of this perspective.  Many public suppliers have proven 
inefficient and incapable of meeting rising demands for both greater 
access and higher quality water, and public suppliers have often not 
generated the reserves needed to expand, modernize, or even maintain 
water infrastructure.51  In the face of these problems, international 
financial institutions have pushed for varying degrees of privatization of 
local water suppliers.52 
Partly as a result, a growing set of nations, including developing 
nations such as Chile, Mexico, and Morocco, have passed laws 
authorizing and facilitating privatization of water-supply systems.  Some 
 
49. LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, at 682; Budds & 
McGranahan, supra note 48, at 91; Davis, supra note 3, at 147. 
50. As one early 20th century commentator put it, 
 
 We have municipal ownership of our police and fire protection because we 
know enough not to entrust the safety of ourselves and our family silver to seekers 
after profit. . . . 
 Municipal ownership [should dominate] the water business primarily for the 
same reason.  We will entrust our light, heat and transportation, but not our life, to 
the mercies of . . . money-making concern[s]. 
Evans Clark, Municipal Ownership in the United States, INTERCOLLEGIATE SOCIALIST, Oct.–
Nov. 1916, at 1, 8–9, reprinted in 4–5 LABOR AGE, 1915–1917 (1968); see also Budds & 
McGranahan, supra note 48, at 90–91 (noting that governments decided that public supply 
systems were “important for both public health and national economic development”). 
51. For empirical evidence that “the public sector has been a costly and inefficient 
provider of infrastructure,” see Davis, supra note 3, at 154 (citing and quoting Theodore 
Panayotou, The Role of the Private Sector in Sustainable Infrastructure Development, in 
BRIDGES TO SUSTAINABILITY: BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT WORKING TOGETHER FOR A 
BETTER ENVIRONMENT 46, 46 (Yale Sch. of Forestry & Envtl. Stud., Bull. Ser. No. 101, 
1997)); see also Budds & McGranahan, supra note 48, at 87 (“There is general agreement that 
public utilities have been too slow in extending access to services and that they can be 
inefficient and corrupt.”). 
52. Bluemel, supra note 4, at 965; Budds & McGranahan, supra note 48, at 90–92. 
THOMPSON-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  11:00 AM 
2011] WATER AS A PUBLIC COMMODITY 29 
countries, such as Great Britain, have turned virtually all of their water-
supply systems over to the private sector.53  Encouraged to consider 
privatization, a growing number of cities have engaged private 
companies or examined the opportunity.54  By 2000, at least ninety-three 
countries had privatized at least some aspects of their water supplies.55  
Indeed, the number of people served by private water suppliers 
increased sixfold from 1990 to 2002, from approximately 50 million 
people to over 300 million.56 
Like water marketing, water privatization remains controversial.57  In 
the 1990s, some privatization efforts generated substantial public 
opposition, in part because privatization was generally accompanied by 
more universal collection of water bills and movement toward full-cost 
pricing of water.58  In many of these cases, public officials ultimately 
reversed the initial decision to privatize the municipal water supply.59  
Perhaps because of such opposition, privatization efforts appear to have 
peaked in the 1990s.60  Where privatization has occurred, however, water 
has begun to look more like other commodities, with private enterprise 
playing a significant role in the production, transportation, purification, 
and delivery of water supplies to domestic users. 
While attracting most of the attention, large-scale privatization of 
municipal suppliers remains only the tip of the iceberg that constitutes 
 
53. See PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., PAC. INST., THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE 
RISKS AND BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER 24 
(2002); Davis, supra note 3, at 153 (noting that private water companies serve all households 
in England and Wales and 80% of French households). 
54. See, e.g., SAX ET AL., supra note 32, at 716 (noting that almost a third of the largest 
metropolitan governments in the United States were considering privatizing some or all of 
their water system and infrastructure in the late 1990s). 
55. Davis, supra note 3, at 153. 
56. Id.  Despite the increase in privatization, however, some estimates show that the 
private sector still provides water to only about 5% of the world’s population.  Budds & 
McGranahan, supra note 48, at 88. 
57. For discussions of the controversy from various perspectives, see Budds & 
McGranahan, supra note 48; and Davis, supra note 3. 
58. See Davis, supra note 3, at 165–69. 
59. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, WATER PRIVATIZATION FIASCOS: BROKEN PROMISES AND 
SOCIAL TURMOIL 3–7 (2003) (noting the situations in Atlanta, Manila, Cochabamba, and 
Jakarta). 
60. See Budds & McGranahan, supra note 48, at 102 (noting that privatization peaked in 
1997 and thereafter began to decline); Davis, supra note 3, at 175 (noting both that the 
“cancellation of high-profile concession agreements . . . has helped galvanize civic and 
advocacy groups opposed to privatization” and that several global firms have “reevaluated 
their involvement” in light of “political and financial risk”). 
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the growing involvement of private entrepreneurs in water supply.  The 
rise of small-scale private suppliers, often with the tacit approval of local 
officials, has been of far greater importance to most urban and 
agricultural water users in developing nations.  Using carts, bicycles, 
poles, or trucks, small private entrepreneurs supply water to a 
substantial proportion of the one billion people around the world who 
lack access to improved water supplies.61  Indeed, by one estimate, small 
private entrepeneurs supply water to anywhere from one-quarter to 
one-half of all urban residents of Latin America and Africa.62  In many 
urban areas, households with direct access to public water systems also 
sell water to their neighbors, often through rudimentary piping systems 
that constitute informal extensions of the public-supply infrastructure.  
Recognizing the value of these informal water markets, some city 
administrators are now looking at how to promote them.63 
Similar small-scale markets have also arisen in agricultural regions.  
In parts of Asia, for example, farmers are highly dependent on 
groundwater to irrigate their crops.64  Declines in groundwater tables, 
however, have made it prohibitively expensive for poorer farmers to 
drill and operate wells.  Many farmers with wells have responded by 
selling a portion of their groundwater to farmers who lack direct access 
of their own.  Significant “tubewell markets” now exist in China, India, 
and Pakistan.65  In northern China, 44% of farming villages have active 
tubewell markets (up from only 9% as recently as 1995).66  More than 
70% of tubewell owners, moreover, sell at least some groundwater 
through these markets.67  On the other side of the supply–demand 
equation, approximately 20% of households in the region depend on 
 
61. Davis, supra note 3, at 150. 
62. Id. (citing Tova Maria Solo, Small-Scale Entrepreneurs in the Urban Water and 
Sanitation Market, 11 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 117, 118 n.1 (1999)). 
63. STANFORD UNIV., WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV’T, PROGRAM ON WATER, HEALTH 
AND DEVELOPMENT: PROMOTING SAFE, SUSTAINABLE WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION 
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5, 9, 11–13 (2010), available at http://woods.stanford.edu/ideas 
/water-and-development/water-and-development.pdf (describing activities in Mozambique). 
64. Tushaar Shah, The Groundwater Economy of South Asia: An Assessment of Size, 
Significance and Socio-ecological Impacts, in THE AGRICULTURAL GROUNDWATER 
REVOLUTION: OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS TO DEVELOPMENT 7, 7 (Mark Giordano & 
Karen G. Villholth eds., 2007). 
65. See, e.g., Lijuan Zhang et al., Development of Groundwater Markets in China: A 
Glimpse into Progress to Date, 36 WORLD DEV. 706, 709 (2008). 
66. Id. at 709–10 & tbl.1. 
67. Id. at 720. 
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these markets to meet their domestic and agricultural needs.68 
4.   Summary 
While many parts of the world continue to reject the Dublin 
Statement’s view that water should be viewed as an “economic good,” 
the theme has attracted a substantial number of adherents over the last 
quarter century.  More importantly, it has led to significant practical 
change in the provision and management of water.  Water is now subject 
to economic pricing, markets, and private provision in many parts of the 
world—eroding the old perspective of water as a common good. 
C.  Water as a Human Right 
The most recent and least developed view of water is water as a 
human right.69  Interestingly, water was not included in early lists of 
human rights.  Over the last thirty years, however, access to an adequate 
supply of safe water for personal and domestic use has slowly emerged 
as a fundamental human right, although many developed nations, 
including the United States, continue to oppose the concept. 
Lacking any direct support for a human right to water in 
international law, proponents of the right initially argued that the right 
to water was implicit within various other recognized rights, reasoning 
that access to water was necessary to effectuate those rights.  For 
example, in the latter half of the twentieth century, various 
commentators and international institutions linked a right to water to 
the rights to life and health found in the International Bill of Human 
Rights.70  The right to water elsewhere was associated by rights 
recognized by the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, including rights to adequate housing and food.71 
The right to water for personal and domestic use has picked up 
significant independent support in the twenty-first century.  In 2002, for 
example, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Cultural, and 
Social Rights formally recognized access to water for basic domestic 
needs as an independent human right—although the committee 
 
68. Id. at 718. 
69. For general analyses of water as a human right, see both Bluemel, supra note 4, and 
Gleick, supra note 4. 
70. See, e.g., Bluemel, supra note 4, at 968; Gleick, supra note 4, at 488. 
71. See, e.g., Bluemel, supra note 4, at 969–70 (noting that all are three rights are 
fundamental to an adequate standard of living). 
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continued to justify the right as essential to meet other human rights.72  
According to the U.N. Committee, “The human right to water entitles 
everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible, and 
affordable water for personal and domestic use[s].”73  At approximately 
the same time, the International Law Association concluded that “every 
person has a right . . . of access to water adequate to meet that person’s 
vital human needs.”74  In 2005, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights declared that the right to 
adequate water is both a separate human right and a corollary of other 
human rights.75 
The drive to recognize a human right to water recently culminated in 
an explicit declaration of the United Nations General Assembly, which 
concluded that “clean drinking water . . . [is] integral to the realization 
of all human rights” and “essential for the full enjoyment of life.”76  The 
resolution also called on all nations to help meet this human right by 
providing financial resources, building capacity, and transferring needed 
technology to developing countries.77  One hundred twenty-two nations, 
including most members of the European Union, voted in favor of the 
assembly declaration, and none voted against.78  However, forty-one 
 
72. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶¶ 1–
3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003). 
73. Id. 
74. Two years later, the International Law Association concluded that “[e]very 
individual has a right of access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible, and 
affordable water to meet that individual’s vital human needs.”  Int’l Law Ass’n, Berlin Rules 
of Water Resources art. 17, § 1, in 71 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 337, 365 (2004). 
75. Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on 
Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social & Cultural Rights: Promotion of the 
Realization of the Right to Drinking Water and Sanitation, pmbl., § 1, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/25 
(July 11, 2005) (by El Hadji Guissé). 
76. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES.64/292 (July 28, 2010); Press Release, Gen. Assem., General Assembly Adopts 
Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human Right, By Recorded 
Vote of 122 in Favor, None Against, 41 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release GA/10967 (July 28, 
2010). 
77. Press Release, supra note 76. 
78. Id.; see also Peter H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water (and Sanitation), 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-h-gleick/the-human-
right-to-water_b_671175.html; Mark Leon Goldberg, Why the United States Did Not Support 
“Water as a Human Right” Resolution, UN DISPATCH (July 28, 2010), 
http://www.undispatch.com/why-the-united-states-did-not-support-water-as-a-human-right-
resolution; General Assembly Declares Access to Clean Water and Sanitation Is a Human 
Right, UN NEWS CENTRE (July 28, 2010), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 
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countries, including the United States, Australia, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, abstained.79  While only abstaining, the United States 
publicly declared its view that there is no human right to water as a 
matter of international law.80 
The constitutions of a small but growing number of countries also 
recognize a right to water for personal and domestic use.81  In a handful 
of cases, the right is explicit in the constitution.82  For example, South 
Africa’s 1996 Bill of Rights explicitly provides that everyone enjoys the 
“right to have access to . . . sufficient . . . water,” and provides that the 
government must take “reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization” of 
the right.83  In other cases, courts or governmental agencies have 
concluded that other rights within their constitutions implicitly embody 
a right to water.  For example, India’s courts have concluded that its 
constitutional right to life includes the right to clean and sufficient 
water.84 
Like water as a commodity, the view that water is a human right 
remains highly contested.  As noted, approximately 20% of all the 
countries who are members of the United Nations voted to abstain from 
the recent declaration of water as a human right.  Except in a few 
countries such as South Africa, there has been far more discussion of 
why water should be a human right than action taken to actually supply 
the poorer residents of developing nations with an adequate and clean 
supply of water for personal and domestic use.  Indeed, because the 
 
35456&Cr=SANITATION&Cr1=. 
79. See Gleick, supra note 78; Goldberg, supra note 78 (identifying the United States as 
one of the abstaining countries). 
80. Explanation of Vote by John F. Sammis, U.S. Deputy Rep. to the Econ. & Social 
Council, on Resolution 1/64/L.63/Rev.1, the Human Right to Water (July 28, 2010), 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/145279.htm (by John F. Sammis). 
81. See generally Bluemel, supra note 4, at 977–85 (most notably, South Africa, India, 
and Argentina). 
82. In addition to the discussion of South Africa’s constitutional provision in the text, 
see CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA art. XIV, § (b) (“[A]ll Ugandans enjoy rights and 
opportunities and access to . . . clean and safe water . . . .”). 
83. S. AFR. CONST. § 27(1)–(2), 1996; see also The Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. 
Grootboom 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 49 F (S. Afr.).  In 1998, the South African government, 
through its National Water Act, provided for the implementation of the affirmative duty to 
provide water.  National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 5(1), (3).  For a general discussion of the 
South African right to water, see Takacs, supra note 13, at 740–47. 
84. See, e.g., Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, 10 S.C.C. 664, 767 (2000) 
(India) (water is part of right to life under article 21 of the Indian Constitution); Attakoya 
Thangal v. Union of India, 1990 (1) Ker L.T. 580 (India). 
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concept of water as a human right is so new, there is still significant 
uncertainty as to what it means and requires, both within countries and 
internationally.  The view that water is a human right, nonetheless, has 
picked up considerable support over the last quarter century and has 
provided forensic support to individuals and nongovernmental 
organizations arguing for policies designed to provide adequate and 
clean water access for the poor. 
III.  TENSIONS AND HARMONIZATION 
Looked at individually, the ascendancy of the themes discussed in 
Part I is not surprising.  Each theme responds to a particular set of needs 
and parallels general thematic trends elsewhere in the field of the 
environment and natural resources.  The theme of water as a public 
trust responds to growing environmental concerns over the world’s 
aquatic ecosystems and parallels the new global emphasis on 
environmental sustainability.  Water as a commodity responds to the 
growing recognition that water is too scarce to waste and parallels the 
general interest in market solutions to environmental problems.  Finally, 
the emphasis on water as a human right responds to the devastating fact 
that over one billion people in the world still do not have access to 
adequate and clean freshwater, and it forms one part of a growing global 
focus on human rights. 
What may seem surprising is that all three themes have become 
more influential at the same time.  As discussed below, the themes are 
frequently seen as conflicting.  Water as a commodity, in particular, is 
often viewed as inconsistent with and even undermining the themes of 
water as a public trust and a human right.  An open question, therefore, 
is whether the three themes will continue to grow in tandem, or whether 
one or more of the visions will win out over the others. 
A.  Perceived Conflicts 
1.   Public Trust Versus Human Right 
Of the three themes, “water as a public trust” and “water as a human 
right” would seem the most reconcilable.  If the government holds water 
in trust for the overall public, ensuring adequate and safe water for 
personal and domestic needs should arguably be at the top of the list of 
trust purposes.  And citizens without adequate access might legitimately 
urge that the nation has failed to meet its trust responsibilities. 
Interestingly, public trust cases have never addressed this issue.  As 
noted in Part II.A, public trust cases in the United States historically 
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focused on non-consumptive uses of water (e.g., navigation, commerce, 
and fishing) and, more recently, have turned to environmental 
protection.85  Given the particular freshwater concerns at the relevant 
points of time in U.S. history, these emphases might not be surprising, as 
there has never been a major human-rights focus on water issues in the 
United States.  Yet public trust cases in developing nations, all of which 
have been of recent vintage, also have focused primarily on 
environmental concerns.86 
Commentators have begun to see the potential connections between 
water as a public trust and water as a human right.  Thus, a recent paper 
commissioned by the IUCN Environmental Law Programme discusses 
the public trust doctrine in connection with the potential use of 
customary international law to enforce a human right to water.87  Even 
here, however, the paper uses the public trust doctrine as an example of 
the power of customary legal doctrines, and it never expressly suggests 
that the public trust doctrine requires universal access to adequate and 
clean water.88 
In theory, the emphasis in modern public trust cases on 
environmental protection could conflict with the growing emphasis on a 
human right to water.  The potential for conflict depends on how 
broadly a human right is defined.  For example, could a human right 
require governments to import and provide water to growing urban 
populations in water-scarce regions, to the detriment of instream flows 
or other parts of the environment, rather than permit them to deter 
additional growth by refusing to provide new water supplies?  A 
governmental policy that considers water availability in planning land 
uses and that discourages urban growth in areas with already-scarce 
water supplies would seem consistent with both public trust and human-
right themes.  Indeed, such a policy might prove more effective in 
meeting a human right to water than trying to find the domestic or 
international resources necessary to provide needed urban 
infrastructure.  However, the vast majority of urbanization in the 
developing world is unplanned, leaving open the question of whether a 
nation could try to discourage new urban growth by announcing that it 
 
85. See supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text. 
86. See, e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996) Supp. 10 S.C.R. 12 (India); Waweru v. 
The Republic, (2006) 1 K.L.R. 677, 687–88 (H.C.K.) (Kenya). 
87. John Scanlon et al., Water as Human Right? 9–10 (IUCN Envtl. Pol’y & L. Paper No. 
51, 2004). 
88. Id. 
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will not furnish water to unauthorized urban slums.  While such a policy 
might be consistent with treating water as a public trust, it could be 
arguably inconsistent with a broadly defined human right to access. 
Opponents of environmental protection have occasionally invoked a 
broad claim of human rights to justify harmful water withdrawals.  
Governmental efforts to protect California’s San Joaquin–Sacramento 
Delta provide a recent example.  Federal agencies and courts have 
limited exports of water from the Delta to protect endangered and 
threatened fish species, including Delta smelt and winter-run Chinook 
salmon.89  The San Joaquin Valley agricultural community, which has 
received less irrigation water as a result, has argued that the human 
need for food and jobs should trump these environmental concerns.90  
Drawing on a broad vision of the human right to water that emphasizes 
the importance of water not only to personal and domestic needs, but 
also for the production of an adequate food supply to feed the world’s 
burgeoning population and for jobs, opponents of Delta restrictions 
have attempted to shape the dispute as a battle between the 
environment and human rights.91 
2.   Conflicts Stemming from Treating Water as a Commodity 
Despite occasional concerns about potential conflicts between 
treating water as a public trust and recognizing a broad human right to 
water, the major concern raised by commentators has been the 
possibility of conflicts with these two visions if water is treated as a 
commodity.92  This is not surprising.  As discussed in Part II, many 
traditional water rules and policies, driven in large part by views 
consistent with the public trust vision of water, seem inconsistent with 
the commoditization of water.  Efforts to price water at its full price, 
promote water markets, and privatize the public supply of water often 
seem to clash with ethical precepts underlying the public trust doctrine. 
Consider, for example, privatization.  The Supreme Court’s 1892 
 
89. For overviews of the Delta controversy, see ELLEN HANAK ET AL., MANAGING 
CALIFORNIA’S WATER: FROM CONFLICT TO RECONCILIATION 59–65 (2011); LEGAL 
CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES II, supra note 32, at 628–39. 
90. See, e.g., Katie Paul, Dying on the Vine, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 23, 2009), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/23/dying-on-the-vine.html. 
91. See Malia Wollan, Hundreds Protest Cuts in Water in California, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
16, 2009, at A17. 
92. See, e.g., Corporate Water Privatization: Water is a Human Right, Not a Commodity, 
SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/committees/cac/water/human_right/ (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2011) [hereinafter SIERRA CLUB]. 
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opinion in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,93 the progenitor of the 
modern trust doctrine in the United States, appeared explicitly to 
conclude that the privatization of a public trust resource is inconsistent 
with the government’s public trust responsibilities.94  In Illinois Central, 
the issue was whether the government could turn the harbor of a major 
city over to a private railroad company to manage and develop.95  
Concluding that such a transfer was either void or voidable under the 
public trust doctrine (even though the railroad agreed to protect and 
promote navigation), Justice Stephen Field noted, “The State can no 
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are 
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave 
them entirely under the use and control of private parties . . . than it can 
abdicate its police powers.”96  If the government cannot turn a harbor 
over to a private company, how can it privatize an entire urban water 
system?  If anything, the public interests in public control are arguably 
greater in the case of water supplies than in navigation.  As discussed in 
Part II.B.3, concerns over the ability of profit-maximizing companies to 
protect water quality and invest in adequate infrastructure led most 
cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to replace 
private water suppliers with municipal water agencies. 
Or consider water marketing.  As noted earlier, most governments, 
including many states and territorial governments in the nineteenth 
century American West, explicitly prohibited water transfers for reasons 
that parallel elements of the vision of water as a public trust.  One of the 
most influential opponents of water transfers was Elwood Mead, 
Wyoming’s state engineer and a key leader in the development of the 
prior-appropriation system of water rights.  In Mead’s view, water 
markets were inconsistent with the view that water was a public 
resource with ownership held by the government for the ultimate 
benefit of all citizens: 
 
If water is to be so bartered and sold, then the public should not 
give streams away, but should auction them off to the highest 
bidder. 
. . . . 
 
93. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
94. Id. at 452–53. 
95. Id. at 433–34. 
96. Id. at 453. 
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In monarchies streams belong to the crown, and in the early 
history of irrigation in Italy and other parts of Europe, favorites 
of the rulers were rewarded with grants of streams.  But in a 
republic they belong to the people, and ought forever to be kept 
as public property for the benefit of all who use them, and for 
them alone, such use to be under public supervision and 
control.97 
 
Apparent conflicts between water commoditization and the other 
two ascendant water themes continue today.  One of the reasons that 
human-rights advocates have pushed strongly in recent years for the 
explicit recognition of a human right to water has been to help fight 
against efforts at privatization.98  The advocates fear that privatized 
water companies will make it more difficult for the poor to obtain water 
directly from urban systems.  Part of the reason is that privatization of 
urban water supplies almost always has been accompanied, often at the 
explicit request of the contracting government, by increased collection 
of water bills and higher water rates.99  Empirical studies have confirmed 
that privatization virtually always leads to increases in monthly water 
fees.100  Part of the reason is also the belief that profit-maximizing water 
companies will inevitably favor the richer communities of a city and 
neglect poorer areas because of the differences in potential profits.101 
Advocates for the urban poor have been successful in disrupting 
privatization plans through the assertion of human rights.  The 
demonstrations and general strike that followed Bolivia’s efforts to 
privatize the water system of Cochabamba provides the best-known 
example.  Rate increases that followed the takeover of the water system 
by Bechtel Corporation, along with other actions, led to substantial and 
ultimately successful opposition.102  The resulting Cochabamba 
 
97. MEAD, supra note 36, at 264, 365–66. 
98. See, e.g., Bluemel, supra note 4, at 963 (“Calls for recognition of a human right to 
water have largely resulted from a mistrust and fear of treating water as an economic good.”). 
99. Davis, supra note 3, at 165–67. 
100. Id. at 166. 
101. Id. at 170 (“A private firm will understandably be more interested in extending 
services to those areas where effective demand for improved services is highest and where the 
cost of service provision is lowest—both characteristics which typically apply to higher-
income neighborhoods.”). 
102. For an overview of the Cochabamba conflict, see Bluemel, supra note 4, at 965–67.  
For a more in-depth analysis, see generally OSCAR OLIVERA, ¡COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR 
IN BOLIVIA (2004). 
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Declaration provides one of the clearest statements of the perceived 
inconsistency of commoditization with the treatment of water as a public 
trust and human right: 
 
For the right to life, for the respect of nature and the uses 
and traditions of our ancestors and our peoples, for all time the 
following shall be declared as inviolable rights with regard to the 
uses of water given us by the earth: 
1. Water belongs to the earth and all species and is sacred to 
life, therefore, the world’s water must be conserved, reclaimed, 
and protected for all future generations and its natural patterns 
respected. 
2. Water is a fundamental human right and a public trust to 
be guarded by all levels of government, therefore, it should not be 
commodified, privatized, or traded for commercial purposes.  
These rights must be enshrined at all levels of government.  In 
particular, an international treaty must ensure these principles 
are incontrovertible. 
3. Water is best protected by local communities and citizens 
who must be respected as equal partners with governments in 
the protection and regulation of water.  Peoples of the earth are 
the only vehicle to promote earth democracy and save water.103 
 
Subsequent to the Cochabamba Declaration, opponents of 
privatization have used the theme of human rights, as well as the public 
trust doctrine, to kill proposed private concessions in such high-profile 
cities as Buenos Aires, Argentina; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Manila, 
Philippines.104 
Environmentalists have enjoyed a more mixed relationship with the 
commoditization of water.  Some more market-oriented environmental 
organizations, such as the Environmental Defense Fund, have pushed 
for higher water prices and water markets as effective means of 
increasing conservation and thus reducing stresses on natural water 
systems.105  Other environmental groups, by contrast, have worried 
 
103. The Cochabamba Declaration, Dec. 8, 2000, reprinted in OLIVERA, supra note 102 
(emphasis added). 
104. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 59, at 2–7. 
105. See, e.g., STAVINS, supra note 23, at v (highlighting an EDF study advocating the 
use of water markets to relieve pressure on natural water systems). 
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about the long-term potential impact that viewing water as a commodity 
would have on environmental arguments based on the public trust 
doctrine.106  Whether an environmental group sees a serious conflict has 
depended in part on whether the group focuses on practical policy or 
rhetorical impact. 
B.  The Case for Harmonization 
The three themes need not conflict, but instead can work together to 
provide a more complete and effective vision for water management.  
Harmony results in part from recognizing that the themes play different 
roles in shaping water management.  Both the public trust doctrine and 
the human right to water set goals for water management.  In particular, 
both emphasize that the goal of water management is not simply to 
promote economic development.  While not denying the importance of 
using water for economic development, water managers must protect 
the environment and other communal interests in waterways (such as 
navigation and fish stocks)—this being the role of the public trust 
doctrine—and they must ensure that all citizens have basic access to 
water for personal and domestic use (the human right).  
Commoditization of water, by contrast, provides a mechanism for 
achieving these goals, as well as the separate goals of minimizing costs 
and maximizing the economic value of other consumptive uses of water.  
Viewed as a tool, commoditization can support rather than conflict with 
both the public trust and a human right to water—if designed to 
promote these goals and not simply overall societal wealth.  Finally, the 
public trust doctrine places an institutional side constraint on water 
management by ensuring that the government can always reconfigure 
water rights and policy in the interest of the general public—no matter 
what private rights it has awarded.  The public trust doctrine, in short, 
restricts the extent of commoditization that can occur. 
The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, 
discussed earlier, incorporates all three themes, seeing little if any 
apparent conflict among them.  As noted, the Dublin Statement 
promoted recognizing water as an “economic good.”107  In introducing 
this principle, however, the Dublin Statement noted, “Within this 
principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human beings 
 
106. See, e.g., SIERRA CLUB, supra note 92 (objecting to view that water should be 
treated as a commodity). 
107. Dublin Statement, supra note 25, princ. 4. 
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to have access to clean water . . . at an affordable price.”108  More 
importantly, the Dublin Statement emphasizes that water should be 
treated as an economic good not as a goal in itself, but because of its 
instrumental value.  Failure to treat water as an economic good can lead 
to “wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the resource.”109  
Managing it as an economic good is thus a particularly effective means 
of encouraging conservation and “achieving efficient and equitable 
use.”110  Getting into specifics of water management, the statement also 
emphasizes that improved pricing of urban water supplies can help 
encourage conservation, reduce system losses, and by financially 
enabling recycling and reuse, hopefully free up water for both growing 
urban regions and environmental needs.111 
1.   Commoditization and the Public Trust 
Governments can and do use markets to promote a number of 
public trust goals, including environmental protection.  Because the 
environment is a public good, government intervention and regulation is 
essential to its protection; private markets for environmental protection 
will neither reflect intrinsic values of the environment nor, given 
collective action problems, even fully reflect personal preferences for 
environmental protection.112  However, the commoditization of water, by 
increasing water efficiency, can reduce the pressure on existing 
environmental flows and on groundwater aquifers.113  Private water 
markets, moreover, can both assist the government in achieving 
environmental protection and permit individuals to contribute toward a 
higher level of protection than the government provides.114 
Because protection of aquatic environments can require reductions 
 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Dublin Statement, supra note 25, The Action Agenda. 
112. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private 
Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 255 (2001–2002) (noting that “philanthropic conservation” will 
not reflect the full value of the conservation because (1) some people will be tempted to “free 
ride” on the contributions of others, and (2) people will not have adequate information to 
judge the value); see also JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 17–19 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining why public goods may 
be underproduced). 
113. See STAVINS, supra note 23 (explaining how water markets in Southern California 
could help protect the environment). 
114. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 261, 263–64 (2000) [hereinafter Markets for Nature]. 
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in water withdrawals, existing water users frequently oppose proposed 
governmental protections.  In recent years, governments in developed 
nations have often turned to markets to achieve environmental 
protection over such opposition.  For example, in much of the western 
United States, both the federal and state governments have purchased 
water from willing sellers and then dedicated the water to instream 
flow.115  California also created an Environmental Water Account 
(EWA) to purchase sufficient water to offset losses in water exports 
when pumps in the state’s Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta had to be 
shut down to save endangered fish.116  Prior to the EWA, the 
government repeatedly ran into political opposition when it tried to shut 
down the pumps because this led to reduced exports; such opposition 
led not only to legal disputes, but also to delays in the governmental 
orders.117  The EWA reduced political tensions by purchasing sufficient 
water to make whole the recipients of the exported water.118 
In the American West, a growing number of philanthropic “water 
trusts” now supplement governmental protections of environmental 
flows through market transactions.  Much like how The Nature 
Conservancy and other land trusts purchase real estate for conservation, 
water trusts either lease or purchase water rights and then can dedicate 
the water to instream flow.119  Beginning with the creation of the Oregon 
Water Trust (now the Freshwater Trust) twenty years ago, water trusts 
now exist in a majority of the western states.120  Land trusts, moreover, 
are beginning to acquire water rights as part of their conservation 
mission.121  Recognizing the environmental value of such trusts, a 
growing number of western states have passed laws authorizing 
 
115. Id. at 267–70. 
116. Id. at 308–10 (describing the EWA’s proposals and purposes prior to the EWA 
being finalized).  For more information on the EWA, see generally Alf W. Brandt, An 
Environmental Water Account: The California Experience, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 426 
(2002); and Larry R. Brown et al., Managing Water to Protect Fish: A Review of California’s 
Environmental Water Account, 2001–2005, 43 ENVTL. MGMT. 357 (2009). 
117. Markets for Nature, supra note 114, at 309–10 (noting the difficulty of increasing 
flow requirements over opposition of existing users). 
118. Id. at 308–10. 
119. See Simon Hone et al., A Role for the Private Sector in the Provision of River and 
Riparian Goods?, 30 ECON. PAPERS 157, 158 (2011); Markets for Nature, supra note 114, at 
271, 286–87. 
120. For a history of the first ten years of the Freshwater Trust, see Janet C. Neuman, 
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: The First Ten Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. 
REV. 432 (2004). 
121. Markets for Nature, supra note 114, at 271. 
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environmental transfers and protecting the resulting flows.122 
In many parts of the world, privatization of water supply systems 
also benefits environmental protection.  Water suppliers are highly 
fragmented throughout much of the world, including the United States 
(due both to the way in which water systems historically developed and 
to the desire of individual localities to each have their own water 
systems).  Municipality-specific suppliers are often too small to have the 
expertise needed to comply with water quality regulations.123  In many 
developing regions, moreover, suppliers are insufficiently staffed for 
environmental compliance.  Privatization of water suppliers may be an 
effective means to provide the needed expertise and revenue to improve 
environmental performance.  Indeed, privatization in a number of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries has led to greater compliance with environmental standards.124  
Experience with privatization to date raises doubts over Justice 
Field’s suggestion in Illinois Central that turning a public trust resource 
over to a private firm undermines the government’s public trust 
responsibility.125  As noted earlier, Justice Field equated privatization 
with abdication of the government’s police power.  Technically, of 
course, that is not true.  The government retains its police power over 
natural resources no matter who owns them (although the takings 
protections may limit the ability of the government to exercise its police 
power without compensation in the United States).  Private water 
suppliers must meet environmental standards no less than public 
suppliers.  And as just noted, private suppliers may do a better job of 
meeting environmental standards in some cases.  Interestingly, studies 
suggest that the better performance of private suppliers may be due not 
only to stronger capabilities, but also to the fact that regulatory agencies 
often appear to enforce standards more rigorously against private firms 
than against fellow governmental agencies.126  In short, the public trust 
 
122. See id. at 287. 
123. See SAX ET AL., supra note 32, at 716.  The abilities of private suppliers to meet 
environmental standards and maintain up-to-date technology are reasons that cities have 
investigated privatization.  See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Privatization of Municipal Water 
Suppliers, LOOKING AHEAD, June 1999, at 1, 4. 
124. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 163 (“Case-based evidence in several OECD 
countries suggests that privatization has helped utilities achieve compliance with water quality 
and wastewater treatment standards.”).  That does not mean, however, that private water 
suppliers do not violate pollution standards.  Id. at 164.   
125. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
126. Davis, supra note 3, at 164. 
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might actually benefit from separating the poacher from the 
gamekeeper, rather than merging them through governmental control of 
both the water supply system and the regulatory regime. 
2.  Commoditization and Human Rights 
Treating water as a commodity also can help implement a human 
right to water.127  Although the populations of some cities have 
outstripped their available water supplies, the major problem in 
ensuring everyone a clean and adequate supply of freshwater in most of 
the world is access rather than total supply.128  Many parts of the world 
do not have the financial capital or the political commitment to supply 
water to all residents through public-supply systems.129  Lacking an 
improved public supply, people must obtain water themselves either 
from local waterways or aquifers, yet many do not have the money or 
other resources needed to do so. 
Full-cost pricing of urban water supplies can help address both the 
adequacy of the water supplies and lack of access.  By encouraging 
conservation, full-cost pricing can help stretch available supplies among 
a larger population.  Full-cost pricing also can provide additional 
revenue for expansion of infrastructure.  And full-cost pricing does not 
necessarily prevent access by the poor.  For example, tiered pricing 
systems, under which small users receive water for free or for a 
“lifeline” price but water rates rise as overall consumption increases, can 
ensure water for the poor while confronting larger water users with the 
full marginal cost of their water.130  Cities also can charge all users the 
full cost of their water, but provide poor consumers with an offsetting 
lump-sum subsidy. 
As noted in Part II, small-scale water markets are also helping to 
provide water access to urban and rural residents in large areas of the 
world.  Consider, for example, the groundwater markets in parts of 
Asia.  A recent study of the groundwater markets by economists with 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences found that the markets provided 
water access to poor farmers who otherwise would have lacked feasible 
 
127. See Budds & McGranahan, supra note 48, at 95 (“There is no inherent conceptual 
contradiction between private sector participation and the achievement of human rights, but 
contradictions will arise in particular circumstances.”). 
128. See Davis, supra note 3, at 165, 169. 
129. Id. at 154–56. 
130. For a recent discussion on tiered pricing in the water field, see HANAK ET AL., 
supra note 89, at 270–72. 
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water supplies—markets were of the greatest importance to farmers 
who were small, less educated, and older.131  By bridging the access gap, 
the water markets also reduced income gaps among the farmers.  
Despite fears that water markets might lead to price gouging, the 
groundwater markets in Asia were very competitive—with low profit 
margins—so the benefits went largely to the water purchasers.132  Studies 
of small-scale water suppliers in areas such as Africa also suggest that 
water markets can aid the poor by providing reliable water delivery and 
flexible financial arrangements, such as short-term credit.133 
Large-scale privatization of urban water supply systems also can 
increase population coverage (as well as the quality of the water supply, 
as discussed earlier).  Many countries have turned to privatization 
because of the greater access to international capital markets that many 
large private water suppliers enjoy.134  Empirical studies suggest that 
privatization has often led to accelerated capital investment in 
infrastructure expansion, although the levels of investment have 
sometimes fallen short of the target increases agreed to by the supplier 
as part of the privatization agreement.135 
Privatization does not guarantee solutions and, if poorly managed, 
can actually undermine access for the poorest members of society.  
Whether privatization improves access depends in part on how a city 
structures the bidding for the right to run the municipal water supply 
system and on the terms of the contract.  For example, cities often 
choose a company based on the payments that each company promises 
to make to the city in exchange for the privilege to run its water supply 
system.  Such a competition encourages companies to look for ways to 
minimize costs so that it can make larger governmental payments, 
undermining company incentive to reinvest in infrastructure 
enlargement.  By contrast, La Paz–El Alto, Bolivia, set basic pricing 
terms and then asked each company to bid based on how much it would 
expand water access to local residents.  As a result, La Paz–El Alto saw 
a significant increase in access through its privatization of the local 
water supply.136 
 
131. Zhang et al., supra note 65, at 718. 
132. Id. at 718–20. 
133. Davis, supra note 3, at 150–51. 
134. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
135. Davis, supra note 3, at 162. 
136. Id. at 170. 
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IV.  WATER AS A PUBLIC COMMODITY 
As discussed in Part III, all three visions for water—water as a public 
trust, as a human right, and as a commodity—are potentially 
harmonious.  Tensions exist among the visions, particularly in the 
assumptions and perspectives often underlying them, but a well-
designed water regime should be able to reduce and manage these 
tensions.  Not only are the three visions reconcilable, but a water regime 
that lacks any one of the visions would be either impoverished or 
ultimately less effective.  The public trust doctrine recognizes the critical 
public goods provided by freshwater resources and the need for 
government to protect and promote such goods.  A human right to 
water reflects the indispensable role of water in human life and personal 
development.  Normative obligations to current and future generations, 
as well as to nature, animate both visions.  However, unless water is 
treated also as a commodity, water regimes will find it more difficult to 
achieve either goal.  Water use for agriculture and industry, which 
makes up the vast majority of water use throughout the world, will also 
be suboptimal, undermining economic development and reducing GDP. 
A vision of water as a public commodity combines all three themes, 
integrating them rather than pitting them against each other.  
Importantly, the vision starts by recognizing the “publicness” of water: 
its critical roles in advancing life, culture, and religion, and supporting 
ecosystems.  But the vision goes on to recognize the importance of 
treating water as a commodity, both in fulfilling the public values of 
water and in maximizing domestic wealth and income.  In this vision, the 
publicness of water acts both to determine a partial set of the goals of 
market mechanisms (and thus to shape the laws underlying the market 
mechanisms) and to limit the markets. 
The water regimes of two developing countries—South Africa and 
Chile—have experimented with the vision of water as a public 
commodity.  The main purpose of South Africa’s post-apartheid water 
law has been to correct former injustices in the allocation of water and 
other resources and to protect the interests of the poor.137  As noted 
 
137. See Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 12.  For useful analyses of South Africa’s water 
system, including its integration of the multiple visions set out earlier in this Article, see 
generally ROGER BATE & RICHARD TREN, THE COST OF FREE WATER: THE GLOBAL 
PROBLEM OF WATER MISALLOCATION AND THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA (2002); and 
Rashid Hassan & Jackie Crafford, Environmental and Economic Accounts for Water in South 
Africa, in THE ECONOMICS OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING APPROACH 114 (Glenn-Marie Lange & Rashid Hassan 
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earlier, the South Africa Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees everyone a 
right of “access to . . . sufficient . . . water” and provides for the 
“progressive realisation of [this] right[].”138  South Africa’s National 
Water Act of 1998 furthers this guarantee, setting out goals of “meeting 
the basic human needs of present and future generations” and 
“promoting equitable access to water.”139  And the country’s Free Basic 
Water Policy “guarantee[s] each person a minimum basic quantity of 
potable water.”140 
South Africa also explicitly adopts a vision of water as a public trust, 
situating the national government as the trustee of the nation’s water 
supplies and calling for water to be used to promote the public interest, 
sustainability, equity, and efficiency.141  Starting with its 1996 
Constitution, South Africa has emphasized environmental protection as 
a matter of both human health and well-being.142  In support of these 
goals, South African law abolishes private ownership of water and 
recognizes ecological water reserves to be used for basic human and 
environmental needs.143 
Yet, within the scope of these goals, South Africa has recognized a 
role for treating water as a commodity.  While unrestricted water 
markets might challenge the nation’s equity goals, limited markets 
within the agricultural sector can increase efficiency without 
undermining the visions of water as either a human right or a public 
trust.144  Therefore, as noted earlier, South Africa has established 
rudimentary water markets, resulting in some local increases in 
efficiency.145  Water markets exist in various areas, including the Lower 
 
eds., 2006). 
138. S. AFR. CONST. § 27(1)(a), (2), 1996. 
139. See Rose Francis, Water Justice in South Africa: Natural Resources Policy at the 
Intersection of Human Rights, Economics, and Political Power, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
149, 161–66 (2005); Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 26. 
140. Francis, supra note 139, at 178. 
141. William L. Andreen, Water Law and the Search for Sustainability: A Comparative 
Analysis, in WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 155, 162 (R. Quentin 
Grafton & Karen Hussey eds., 2011); Robyn Stein, Water Law in a Democratic South Africa: 
A Country Case Study Examining the Introduction of a Public Rights System, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
2167, 2174–76 (2005). 
142. See S. AFR. CONST. § 24(a), 1996 (“Everyone has the right to an environment that 
is not harmful to their health or well-being.”). 
143. Andreen, supra note 141, at 162–63; Francis, supra note 139, at 161–63; Grafton et 
al., supra note 27, at 33; Stein, supra note 141, at 2181–83. 
144. See Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 22. 
145. See id. at 17, 19 (noting limited water transfers in South Africa). 
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Orange River, the Crocodile River, and the Nkwaleni Valley.146  Further, 
in one of its most controversial policies, South Africa emphasizes the 
importance of full-cost recovery in water management and distribution, 
reversing a history of subsidizing water provisions.147 
A diverse set of public and private-sector entities also currently work 
to deliver domestic water, including the basic water supply guaranteed 
to all residents by the Bill of Rights.148  According to the South African 
government, the water challenges facing the country are “simply too big 
to be addressed by government alone,” leaving an important role for 
private entities to play.149  In particular, South Africa was faced with a 
large backlog of infrastructure needs when the African National 
Congress took power in 1994, a challenge which the government felt 
private markets might be able to help address.150  Privatization, to date, 
has occurred in such diverse areas as the Dolphin Coast (where the 
water concession requires the provision of free basic water),151 Nelspruit 
(which has seen an increase in the number of customers at the same 
time that the water supplier has reduced the total amount of water 
 
146. See id. at 17, 19; W.L. Nieuwoudt & R.M. Armitage, Water Market Transfers in 
South Africa: Two Case Studies, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. W09S05, ¶¶ 2, 32–33 (2004). 
147. THE DEP’T OF WATER AFFAIRS, WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL WATER POLICY 
FOR SOUTH AFRICA 5 (1997), available at http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/nwpw
p.pdf; Reynaud Daniels, Implementation of the Right of Access to Sufficient Water Through 
Privatization in South Africa, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 65 (2006); Francis, supra note 
139, at 161, 165, 170–76.  These provisions of South Africa’s water policy have not always 
meshed well with the concept of water as a human right.  Thus, in some situations, the policy 
has led to substantial debt among the poor and, of most concern, the cutting off of water 
supplies despite laws designed to protect low-income consumers and reduce potential 
impacts.  Francis, supra, at 170–74. 
148. See S. AFR. CONST. § 27(1)(b), 1996; Davis, supra note 3, at 152 (citing Mike 
Muller, Public–Private Partnerships in Water: A South African Perspective on the Global 
Debate, 15 J. INT’L DEV. 1115, 1116–20 (2003)).  See generally Daniels, supra note 147 (noting 
the legislative framework in the South African context); Afeikhena Jerome, Private Sector 
Participation in Infrastructure in Africa, in GLOBALISATION, INSTITUTIONS AND AFRICAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE 
2008, at 273 (2010) (detailing the trends of participation in infrastructure and development in 
Africa). 
149. Francis, supra note 139, at 176 (quoting DEP’T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, 
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR WATER SERVICES, WATER IS LIFE, SANITATION IS DIGNITY 
§ 3.4.7 (2003)). 
150. See Daniels, supra note 147, at 65. 
151. See South Africa: Borough of Dolphin Coast, in 2 CASE STUDIES OF BANKABLE 
WATER AND SEWERAGE UTILITIES: COMPENDIUM OF CASE STUDIES 3, 3–12 (USAID ed., 
2005), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE148.pdf.  According to the USAID, 
service provision under the concession is reliable, and the utility is covering all of its costs and 
retaining funds for infrastructure investment.  Id. at 10. 
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needed to supply its customers),152 and Johannesburg.153  South African 
law requires municipalities to regulate all private providers, including 
controlling tariffs and avoiding interruptions in service; and 
municipalities remain ultimately responsible for meeting constitutional 
obligations.154  Privatization has had a mixed record but appears to have 
worked well in those instances where careful attention has been given to 
the structuring of the contract and incentives. 
Chile has also tried integrating multiple themes into its water 
system.155  Since the 1980s, Chile has promoted the use of free markets 
and water transfers to allocate water resources.156  Indeed, Chile is the 
only country to explicitly recognize and protect private rights to water in 
its constitution.  Water markets have taken significant hold in some 
regions of the country.157  According to economic studies, Chile’s 
commoditization of water has significantly contributed to the GDP of 
these regions by allowing water to move from low-value to higher-value 
economic uses and by encouraging conservation.158  For example, one 
 
152. See Daniels, supra note 147, at 83–85 (noting also various problems that have arisen 
over time in connection with the concession); Francis, supra note 139, at 177 
153. Francis, supra note 139, at 177. 
154. Daniels, supra note 147, at 69–71. 
155. For overviews of Chile’s water system, and in particular its use of markets, see 
generally CARL J. BAUER, SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR 
INTERNATIONAL REFORM (2004); Carl J. Bauer, Slippery Property Rights: Multiple Water 
Uses and the Neoliberal Model in Chile, 1981–1995, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 109 (1998); 
Stephen E. Draper, The Unintended Consequences of Tradable Property Rights to Water, 20 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 49, 54–55 (2005); Brendan McNallen, Fixing the Leaks in Brazil’s 
Water Law: Encouraging Sound Private Sector Participation Through Legal and Regulatory 
Reform, 9 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 147, 159–64 (2006); Monica Ríos Brehm & Jorge Quiroz, The 
Market for Water Rights in Chile (World Bank Technical Paper No. 285, 1995). 
156. For general descriptions, see Bjornlund & McKay, supra note 44, at 774–76; Brehm 
& Quiroz, supra note 155, at 1. 
157. Bjornlund & McKay, supra note 44, at 775.  Other parts of the country have not 
seen a similar growth in water transfers.  A variety of factors appear to have limited the 
growth of water markets in these other regions, including a rigid system of water distribution, 
legal uncertainty over water title, the availability of other options to obtain water, and 
conflicting social values.  Id. at 776.  Some observers also report that water-right holders have 
tended to “hoard their rights as a kind of insurance policy to guard against future droughts or 
to await higher prices, and, in some cases, to block competitors from entering the market.”  
Andreen, supra note 141, at 161. 
158. The emphasis on increased efficiency has had a distributional impact, with the 
power sector crowding out a significant number of farmers.  See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, 
Chilean Town Withers in Free Market for Water, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A12 (noting 
competition with mining companies).  Analysts have differed on the success of Chile’s water 
markets.  According to one 1995 study, Chile’s water market “has worked reasonably well, 
especially in zones where water scarcity problems are more acute” and, in some situations, 
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recent study concluded that the benefits from water markets in Chile 
“are substantial and amount to between 8[%] and 32[%] of agricultural 
contribution to regional GDP, or some $22 million annually.”159 
Chile also has been one of four South American countries to actively 
engage in privatization of municipal water supply systems.160  Moreover, 
according to many observers, Chile’s privatization efforts have been 
highly successful, in large part because of active national efforts to 
regulate the water provision of private suppliers, carefully monitor the 
bidding process and contractual performance, and rationalize water 
tariffs.161  Privatization has led to increased investments in infrastructure, 
improved performance, and greater conservation.162 
Chile has tempered this commoditization with recognition of the 
importance of water to all members of its population, including the 
poor.  Consequently, Chile has adopted laws and policies to ensure 
water access by poor farmers and urban users; among these are subsidies 
to help 13% of the nation’s families obtain a minimum quantity of 
potable water at an affordable price.163 
Chile, however, has not done as well in promoting the public trust 
interest in water, particularly for environmental protection.  At a 
rudimentary level, Chile’s water laws appear to support the view of 
water as a public trust; thus, its 1981 Water Code specifically provides 
that “water is a natural resource for public use.”164  But Chile has done 
 
“has helped to avoid expensive new water infrastructure by allowing frictionless transfers of 
water rights from agricultural to urban sectors.”  Brehm & Quiroz, supra note 155, at 28.  For 
a far more skeptical view, see Andreen, supra note 141, at 161 (concluding that Chile’s 
“radical free market approach failed”). 
159. Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 18 (citing Ereney Hadjigeorgalis & Jay Lillywhite, 
The Impact of Institutional Constraints on the Limarí River Valley Water Market, 40 WATER 
RESOURCES RES. W05501, ¶¶ 63–66 (2004)); see also Brehm & Quiroz, supra note 155, at 6–7 
(estimating the economic gains from water markets). 
160. See McNallen, supra note 155, at 159.  The other three countries are Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Brazil.  Id. 
161. Id. at 159–64.  In the early 2000s, all thirteen of the regional water utilities in Chile 
engaged in some type of privatization.  Id. at 163. 
162. See MARIA DE LA LUZ DOMPER, CHILE: A DYNAMIC WATER MARKET 4–5 
(March 2009), available at http://www.policynetwork.net/sites/default/files/Chile_March09. 
pdf. 
163. Davis, supra note 3, at 169; see also McNallen, supra note 155, at 162–63 (explaining 
the subsidy system for the poor).  “In 2001, the scheme totaled 500,000 subsidies and cost 
$20.1 million.  Around 15% of households were covered by the scheme, receiving an average 
subsidy of $10 monthly.”  DE LA LUZ DOMPER, supra note 162, at 6. 
164. See Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 8 (discussing the provisions of the 1981 Water 
Code). 
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little to translate this foundation into effective environmental 
protection.165  Water transfers, for example, are permitted without 
adequate consideration of potential environmental impacts.166  The 
World Bank believes that, as a result, environmental externalities are 
pervasive and likely to become an increasing problem in the future 
unless addressed.167  Unlike South Africa, Chile has not fully integrated 
the three themes into a balanced and effective vision. 
Several lessons can be learned from the experiences of South Africa, 
Chile, and other countries.  First, there are tensions between the visions 
of water as a public trust and a human right, on the one hand, and the 
vision of water as a commodity, on the other.  Markets, without 
governmental intervention, will generally not protect the poor, promote 
the environment, or advance other purely public interests in water 
resources.  The commodification of water can thus lead to greater water 
inequality and to environmental degradation if adequate governmental 
institutions do not exist to protect these other interests.  When 
privatizing water supplies or opening up water markets, governments 
must both ensure that they have the expertise and resources to oversee 
the process and provide for effective regulation of performance. 
Second, the market is not a panacea in addressing water issues.  
While water markets often increase water-use efficiency and help 
allocate water to economically more valuable uses, water markets 
generally face legal, economic, and cultural barriers that preclude them 
from achieving all that they might.  While privatization has increased 
infrastructure investment, performance, and, in some contexts, 
efficiency, it has been less successful in other settings and has sometimes 
failed spectacularly.  The difference between success and failure often 
has depended on the existence of adequate rules and institutions to 
oversee the awarding and implementation of contracts.  Conversely, the 
government has significant roles still to play, not only in promoting 
public access to water and environmental protection, but also in 
 
165. Id. 
166. Andreen, supra note 141, at 161; Draper, supra note 155, at 55; see also Brehm & 
Quiroz, supra note 155, at 25–27 (noting that Chile has had difficulties implementing water 
policies that consider environmental impacts); Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 28 (noting that 
the Water Code fails to address “third-party effects or environmental impacts”).  Water 
transfers also fail to adequately account for third-party impacts on other water-right holders.  
Draper, supra note 155, at 55; Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 28. 
167. Grafton et al., supra note 27, at 28 (citing John Briscoe et al., Managing Water as an 
Economic Resource: Reflections on the Chilean Experience 11 (World Bank, Envtl. Econ. Ser. 
No. 62, 1998)). 
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encouraging greater efficiency. 
Finally, despite these concerns, markets can play and have played a 
critical role in improving water management, and a well-designed water 
policy can harmonize the vision of water as a commodity with both of 
the other two visions.  Water markets, pricing, and privatization are all 
tools that can not only promote greater economic efficiency in water 
use, but, when properly designed, also help increase overall access to 
fresh water in developing nations and increase overall environmental 
protection.  Water systems that ignore these tools are at a disadvantage 
in promoting societal wealth and well-being.  Rather than thinking of 
water in terms of any one of the visions outlined in Part II, governments, 
therefore, should think of water as a public commodity—a resource that 
is inseparable from the public values that it can promote, but a resource 
that is also a commodity and that should be recognized as such within 
the confines of the public values. 
 
